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FOUNDATIONALISM OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM: A CRITICAL REVIEW
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a critical review of two research papers related to the social construction of gender and sexuality. It is argued that social constructionist 
approaches and their theorization of gender are untenable and contradictory with its relation to biological foundationalism. Introduction of gender as an 
analytical category is quite problematic in theory and practice. Gender category complicates the theory rather than clarifying it. A straightforward definition 
of gender will not solve the theoretical problems as well as practical implications. Social constructionist approach presumes reality as constructed, but 
this construction does not occur in a vacuum. Every construction is based on some concrete foundation. Without foundation, construction becomes 
impossible. A social constructionist approach to reality neglects this very fact. It criticizes foundationalism, but then itself is entangled in it.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we have critically reviewed two research papers about 
the social construction of gender and sexuality and the respective 
implications for research design. We have separately reviewed both the 
articles. First, we have provided a summarized overview of what is said 
in each article. Then, we have provided our critique of what is argued 
by the authors.
First paper “The sociological construction of gender and sexuality” 
presents multiple constructionisms and their relation to sociology [1]. 
These are historicism, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and 
materialist feminism. Historicism examines “construction of sex” and 
problematizes the assumed dichotomy of male and female. It traces 
that “opposite sexes emerged during the 18th century” and biological 
differences got relevance with social positions. Historicism investigates 
the historical construction of sex, sexuality, sexual identities in the light 
of contingent historical “frameworks of thought and practices.” Not only 
sexual identities are socially constructed but also their desires. Sexual 
experiences and meanings attached to sexual desires and acts vary 
from time to time. The overall focus of historicism is that it emphasizes 
the “contingency of sexuality as it is currently organized” [1].
Ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism also reject the 
dichotomy of maleness and femaleness. Biological or bodily attributes 
have meaning and significance due to social interactions. A person’s 
sense of self is the outcome “routinized and managed interaction with 
others within shared communities of understanding” that set norms for 
gender performance. Sex is socially constructed as a moral imperative 
within a society. Gender is “doing” in accordance with social norms. 
This “doing” is structurally imposed. Sexuality is a social aspect rather 
than an inherent drive.
Materialist feminism also holds that social structures are contingent. 
Gender and sexuality are the outcomes of these contingent social 
structures. Here, men and women are considered distinct classes. 
Sexuality is not an expression of any essential natural drive.
In response to the critiques selected by the author, the following 
assertions are made:
a. Social constructionist perspectives are anti-foundationalist and social 
constructionist epistemology is not in search of inner truths;
b. Inequalities in gender and sexuality are examined by social 
constructionist perspectives especially materialist feminists;
c. Self-formation is an ongoing interactive process, and essence of self 
is the outcome of this process.
Our critique is that social constructionism can be criticized for its 
determinism. When it is said that sex, gender, identity, personality, 
and orientation are socially constructed, in the process of interactions 
of social agents, freedom of the subject is undermined, and there 
remains no place for individual unique actions. Nothing exists outside 
the discourse, and the discourse deals with the social discovery of 
construction and identification of social changes. There remains no 
rationale for intervention. One major confusions that arises from social 
constructionism is that whether social construction is celebrated or 
criticized? When it is empirically proved that some object, idea, practice, 
or relation is socially constructed, what is the purpose of this endeavor? 
What is the point in saying that sexuality is socially constructed? It is 
evident that there are cultural meanings of sexuality, but it is ridiculous 
to say that sexual expressions of the body are appropriated by a given 
“dominant” ideology or discourse. If subjectivity and sexuality are 
constructed “through the interplay of discursive practices, institutions, 
disciplinary regimes, and biopower” as argued by Foucault, then the 
target of change is practices and institutions. However, what if these 
very practices and institutions are themselves socially constructed? [2].
Suppose the gender roles prevailing in most (or all) of the Muslim 
countries, causing harsh realities of gender inequality for women, are 
socially constructed within the set of certain gender discriminatory 
beliefs and ideologies, and these beliefs and ideologies are socially 
constructed too. Then, what social constructs will be considered 
bad and thus to be changed? What is the legitimacy of thinking the 
otherwise social situations, outcomes, and constructs? Why cannot 
one say that women empowerment, gender freedom, gender justice, 
gender equality, and even the modern woman are social constructs, 
thus not real? Why do we pursue gender equality so vehemently? If 
subjectivities and identities are constructed (even partially) by the 
subject, then this subjectivity problematizes social constructionism. 
Human is free in their actions according to the given situations. It is true 
that institutions and social settings affect individual decisions. Social 
constructionism seems to operate within the bounds of structure. It 
must be called “structural construction” rather social construction. To 
impose or export such ideas and constructs to other societies negates 
social construction. It seems that social constructionism imposes the 
very discipline that it tries to contest.
Ian Hacking (1999) notes that “primary use of ‘social construction’ has 
been for raising consciousness” [3]. In this sense, social constructionism 
becomes mere popular activism instead of a coherent epistemology. 
Gender, sex, sexuality, identity, subjectivity, and so on are argued to 
be socially constructed, hence to be abolished. It will be interesting to 
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assume a situation. Suppose a newborn baby is thrown on the island 
and that baby is alone there and fortunately coming to age. Now how 
that person’s sex or gender will be determined? How that person will 
determine or perceive his/her gender or sex? To which group he/
she will identify himself/herself when he/she comes in contact with 
a couple of (our socially constructed) man and woman? It is quite 
possible that one can construct one’s “own sexual consciousness 
without any social input” [4]. Now consider again the definition of 
gender: “Gender is socially constructed.” This means that gender exists 
only in society, no society, and no gender. However, why should we say 
“socially constructed” if it constructed at all? The emphasis on social 
gives the impression that it may be constructed otherwise, but that 
is not the case. Second, it is not real because it is constructed. Berger 
and Luckmann, 1991 [5], assert that “reality is socially constructed” 
and reality is defined as “a quality appertaining to phenomena that we 
recognize as having a being independent of our own volition.” Here, 
contrary to popular feminist social constructionism, social construction 
is not anti-foundationalist.
The second paper by Kanaak tries to provide guidelines for research in 
gender. It criticizes the emergence of spontaneous sociology, focusing 
the concept of gender adopted by researchers in research designs [6].  
Spontaneous sociology occurs when every researcher uses his own 
definitions of the concepts and in this way deviates from the scientific 
discourse to the commonsense view. Commonsense approach to 
knowledge does not lead to actual knowledge of problems. The initial 
reason for this non-scientific articulation of constructs is that the 
research variables are to be answered by the common respondents who 
do not indulge into theoretical interpretations of the reality. Variables 
are constructed for the non-scientific community, and for this reason, 
variables are defined in common and simplistic terms keeping in mind 
their comprehension level. However, this devaluation and simplicity of 
variables take the researcher away from actual scientific theorization. 
On the other hand, if scientific technical terminology is included in the 
inquiry, then it becomes unrealistic for the respondents to understand 
and respond. Thus, the research design becomes dilemma between 
scientific and common sense. This is the dilemma of research design 
that Kanaak highlights with a specific example of gender [6].
The current standard of gender operationalization in the research 
designs of “spontaneous sociology” is that gender is treated as a single 
measurable variable with only two possible classifications of male 
and female. Moreover, in this operationalization, gender concepts also 
taken as inclusive of sex and sexuality. This operationalization reflects 
a common sense and foundational understanding of popular gender 
discourse in which gender is based on biology. This trend is inaccurate 
and incomplete. Hence, the problem of reconceptualization and 
reframing of gender become inevitable.
This reconceptualization of gender (for operationalization in research 
design) is “founded” on these “anti-foundationalist” assertions:
1. Biology is not the foundation of gender, but gender is a socially 
constructed concept.
2. Gender is not single but multidimensional variable.
3. Third assertion made by the author is the active nature of gender. 
This means gender is dependent variable instead of independent.
4. Gender is amorphous.
These four assumptions are then explained by the author in detail with 
implications for research design. Here, we critically examine these 
assertions.
First assertions mean that foundation is rejected. This anti-
foundationalism rejects any final justification or base for values and 
goals. Every goal and value is equal because every goal is interpreted 
subjectively. This suspension of foundation will logically lead to a 
rejection of even social construction in favor of subjectivity because 
nothing can be made the foundation. Hence, guidance and problem 
solving is meaningless in anti-foundationalism.
The second assertion is the logical outcome of the first assertion because 
when the two standard foundational (biological) categories of male and 
female are rejected then the multiple and multivariate categorization of 
this concept becomes possible. In statistical terminology, gender does 
not remain a “discrete” variable but becomes a “continuous” variable. 
The reason is that every new construction will have equal weight and 
there can be innumerable social constructions from male to female. 
This is evident from the ever-expanding array of gender constructions 
such as homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual, straight, gay, lesbian, 
hypersexual, queer, and trans and mixture of all these.
The fourth assertion of gender morphism is unnecessary, but it adds 
emphasis and validates the above explanations. It is made obvious that 
when biology is rejected as a base then dimorphism is automatically 
rejected see explanation of the second presumption.
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM VERSUS BIOLOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONALISM
First implication for research design is that this paradigm (social 
construction) “helps us to move beyond the strictures of nature/
nurture debate.” This moving beyond does not mean that the debate 
of nature versus nurture is resolved; it simply leaves where it is. This 
simple move simply avoids the discussion of nature versus nurture. 
The researcher would explicitly acknowledge his/her “theoretical 
orientation” toward gender, but the only available theory is that “gender 
is socially constructed”. Again, even this theoretical clarity indicates 
that the originally departed foundationalism is held in contact. This 
The third assertion, again, is the logical and necessary result of 
the  former  first  and  second  assertions.  Interestingly  biological 
foundation is  rejected,  but the social  foundation is  inevitably 
accepted  for  the  theorization  of  gender;  thus,  it  does  not  entail 
anti-foundationalism  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term.  Since  society 
and  social  forces  constantly  evolve  and  change  therefore  social 
constructions  and  hence  gender  also  becomes  active  or  fluid.  No 
construction of  gender is  final  and ultimate but the latest.  This fluid 
nature  of  gender  leads  to  the  performance  of  gender  and  it  is 
assumed that performance is always active. This gender performativity is
 self-evident and not directed to any goal due to active nature of social 
construction and rejection of permanent foundation.
is  the  base  (of  sex).  This  framework  holds  that  “sexual  differences 
are actually constructed by gender”.  Since gender is socially constructed 
and sexual differences are constructed by gender, then it is quite true to 
say  that  sex  or  biology  is  socially  constructed.  With  this 
foundational  turnabout,  foundationalism  is  not  successfully 
escaped but mere a shift is made from biological foundationalism 
to  social  constructionist  foundationalism.  Within  this  shift, 
masculinity  is  socially  constructed  in  the  first  place,  and  then 
maleness  is  socially  constructed  on  the  basis  of  this  socially 
constructed  masculinity.  However,  the  author  does  not  traverse 
further  the  ontological  implications  of  this  priority  of  social  over 
biological.  With  this  insufficient  explanation  of  paradigm  shift,  the 
author  goes  to  explain  implications  for  research  due  to  this 
paradigm shifting.
Under this theme, the conceptual distinctions between sex and gender 
are  explained  at  the  paradigmatic  level.  Sex  is  “biological 
maleness  or  femaleness,”  and  gender  is  social  construction  of 
masculinity  and  femininity.  This  distinction  gives  the 
impression that maleness is something different from masculinity 
and femaleness is different from femininity. Masculinity or femininity,
 in other words, has necessarily nothing to do with maleness or  
femaleness. An individual of male biological characteristics can be
 constructed  as  socially  feminine.  It  means  one  can  claim  that 
one’s sex is male, but one’s gender is female or transgender or intersex.
 A woman can claim that she is a man despite having a womb and giving 
birth  to  babies  being  impregnated  by  certain  “biological”  man  or 
“socially constructed” woman. This claim is held true when sex is 
not  taken  as  the  foundation  of  gender  construction.  Biological 
foundationalism  is  rejected  because  it  is  “problematic 
framework.” Contrary to this framework is the social  constructionism in 
gender  
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clear acknowledgment that “gender” is socially constructed does 
not challenge the claim that “sex” is biologically determined. What is 
important here is that biological foundationalism remains plausible 
paradigm contrary to the initial criticisms of its incompleteness. If only 
“gender is socially constructed,” then what methodological advantage, 
we gain by making gender a base for sexual differences? The clearer 
implication should be that sex and/or gender is socially constructed 
or that we have nothing to do with biology at all. Sex is rejected as a 
foundation to reject the gender dichotomy of spontaneous sociology, but 
the persistent dichotomy of sex-gender makes this “theoretical clarity” 
quite ambiguous. This problematic theoretical ambiguity will remain 
there unless it is clearly declared that “sex is socially constructed.” 
Further, if both sex and gender are socially constructed, then they can 
be assumed as synonymous, or one of them can be rejected outright. 
Biological foundationalism cannot be escaped successfully until the 
dichotomy of sex and gender is present. The only possibility for social 
constructionism is the theorization that sex is socially constructed, and 
gender is nothing but sex; hence, using gender is unnecessary.
MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF GENDER
The second strategy put forward by the author is that gender “must 
be understood at multiple levels of meaning.” This strategy is entailed 
by the first foundational paradigm shift, so it is natural that this too 
assumes sex-gender dichotomy. Important is that if gender is base 
for sexual difference and hence gender and ultimately, sex is socially 
constructed, then there is no need for this emphasis of multiple 
dimensions. This is due to the fact that if something is socially 
constructed then social, cultural, institutional, and other dimensions 
inevitably be taken in consideration. Again, biological foundationalism 
is present in this theorization. Author emphasizes the need to theorize 
gender in its heterogeneity but the same could be done with the 
construct of sex. How can be assumed that sex cannot be understood at 
multiple levels and multiple positions? Indeed, sex can be understood 
within multiple sociocultural contexts then why another categorization 
of gender? Moreover, this heterogeneity and diversity make untenable 
use gender as an independent category of analysis [7,8]. It means the 
very basis of heterogeneity leads to the implausibility of gender as an 
analytical category on which this category is expounded. It is strange 
that the heterogeneity that necessitates avoidance of gender analytic is 
used as its basis.
The author cites three components of gender as implications of 
research design. These are subjectivity, social institution, and cultural 
understanding [6]. By subjectivity, author means that one’s sense of 
being male or female. This feature of gender is popular and incomplete, 
but according to the author, it “does not need to be abandoned.” 
Emphasis on this notion indicates that gender identity or one’s sense of 
being male and female is necessarily based on one’s biology. The second 
feature is also limited to the structuring of individuals in women and 
men only. Institutional aspects of gender are emphasized but again, it 
is argued that even sex can be positioned at the multivariate levels of 
race, class, sex divisions of labor, sexual ideologies, and other social 
hierarchies. The cultural element is also limited to a (biological) man 
and woman. Masculinity and femininity can be understood as different 
diverse patterns of sex rather than gender. Proposing multivariate 
research design author enlists the variables of “race, class, age, sexual 
orientation, work role, gender ideology, reproductive and marital 
status, personality characteristics, life expectancies, and so on.” All these 
variables can also be studied in the biological foundational paradigm 
to analyze and interpret sex. Furthermore, the social construction of 
maleness/masculinity and femaleness/femininity occurs on some 
distinct foundations. Social agents articulate their views and beliefs 
on some bases. When it is accepted that masculinity or femininity is 
socially constructed then it is assumed that this social construction is 
based on some biological foundations. Social construction cannot be 
based on the social construction of social construction. Moreover, when 
we say masculinity and femininity is socially constructed then what 
we actually mean with a difference to sex. The underlying problem 
with this conceptualization of gender is that social construction is 
unconsciously considered only limited to men. Both men and women 
are agents of social construction, and whatever constructions occur 
must be respected in the social constructionist paradigm. Why is there 
so much emphasis on exploration and change of social realities and 
social constructions? In whatever pattern and hierarchy this social 
construction is carried out women are an equal part of this process then 
why only women and their empowerment is emphasized?
GENDER AS PROCESS AND OUTCOME
Third theoretical development discussed by Knaak, 2004, is that gender 
is a continuous process of becoming [6]. Author implicates that gender 
is “an outcome and effect of social forces.” Here, it is not delineated 
by the author how gender is a process as well as an outcome at the 
same time. If gender is process, then its outcome or (net) effect must 
be something other than gender. The author cites that femininities 
are produced through certain practices and maintained thus. It means 
the femininity (gender) is the outcome of a social process that is not 
exclusively a gender process. Moreover, the same thing can be said 
about sex (maleness and femaleness) that is viewed differently from 
different perspectives, time, and places. The social construction of 
femininity does not need to “move beyond” biological sex. Gender as 
a process creates a problem of identity; it becomes mere a floating 
sensation about one’s personal identity that has no sound base neither 
any certain goal. If the gender process is going on, then everyone has 
a temporary idea of one’s identity, and that identity will change, no 
one knows in what way. Hence, it is not only uncertain subjectivity but 
also a crisis of identity. As the author has explained earlier that gender 
is “active,” and this activity is going on, so it is just performance. It is 
“doing” and “becoming” in-itself; it has not any goal or objective because 
the outcome of this process is the process itself. Research implication 
outlined by the author is that gender should be treated as a “dependent” 
variable due to its “active” (ongoing process) nature. One implication of 
this dependent nature of gender is that every measured effect will be 
temporary and not suitable for personal identity. Other implication is 
that some independent variables (i.e. race) are fixed while others are 
changing (social status), but the overall effect on a dependent variable 
will be continuous. The question is how one’s sense of self is affected 
by biology and culture. How a self can ignore or overcome its biological 
reality? Is it sensible to claim that biology along with other sociocultural 
factors has nothing to do with one’s self and identity? Due to this critical 
role of biology, sex dichotomy of male and female is also challenged.
CHALLENGING THE NATURAL ATTITUDE
The author cites a number of studies in support of this claim that 
masculinities and femininities are not single but multiple, forming a 
continuum. The second point is that “behavior, personality, and cognition” 
are overlapping and “not necessarily congruent with one’s biological 
sex.” Interestingly, here, masculinity and femininity are attached to 
biological sex instead of gender as initially described by the author in the 
introductory debate. It gives the impression that sex and gender are the 
same thing as well as masculinity/femininity and maleness/femaleness. 
Moreover, if biological sex is also a continuum instead of fixed dichotomy, 
then there is no need for gender theorization. Further, when biological 
sex is not taken as a foundation for one’s identity, then it does not matter 
whether sex is dichotomous or not. Explaining the implications for 
research design author cites that there are “900 different situations one 
can be in.” This is challenge to dimorphism and gender category as well. 
A third open gender category is advised to be included in the research 
design/questionnaire to achieve empirical accuracy. Since both sex and 
gender are not dichotomous as argued by the author, so it can be said 
that the question about one’s sex or gender should be left open-ended. 
Thus, highest possible accuracy will be achieved.
CONCLUSION
Reviewing the two research papers, we conclude that the concept of 
gender as a social construct and analytical category in the sociological 
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analysis is very problematic. A straightforward definition of gender 
will not solve the theoretical problems as well as practical implications. 
Social constructionist approach presumes reality as constructed, but this 
construction does not occur in a vacuum. Every construction is based on 
some concrete foundation. Without foundation, construction becomes 
impossible. A social constructionist approach to reality neglects this 
very fact. It criticizes foundationalism, but then itself is entangled in it. 
Even in the social constructionist paradigm, if gender and sexuality are 
social constructs, these are to be done away, rejected, and deconstructed. 
Therefore, we have argued that social construction of gender actually 
implies its rejection, not its inclusion, in analysis and social research.
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